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Abstract
This paper aims at creating a third option to foundatio- 
nalism and relativism. It criticizes W illiam D ean’s his- 
toricist radical em piricism  for going too  far tow ard a 
re la tiv ist deconstruction ism , and W entzel van Huys- 
s te e n ’s c ritica l rea lism  fo r n o t leav ing  m odern ism . 
Both, however, succeed in creating a third option. This 
paper examines their respective contributions to a non­
relativist, reconstructionist post-modernism.
1. IN TRO D U C TIO N
Some em ergent positions in religious studies are developing a third option to  foun- 
dationalism  and an arbitrary form of relativism. W illiam D ean’s historicist radical 
em piricism  and W entzel van H uyssteen’s critical realism  are two that m erit a tten ­
tion. They differ in theological roots (the ‘Chicago School’ of theology vs Pannen- 
berg, B artley and Sauter) and philosophical resources (Jam es and W hitehead  vs 
recent philosophy of science). Both thinkers are criticized for having failed to make 
this third option to foundationalism and relativism -  D ean for going too far toward 
a relativist deconstructionism , Van H uyssteen for not leaving m odernism . T heir 
language exposes them  to these criticisms, but an alternative reading suggests they 
succeed in creating a third option.
* This paper was read al the Group on Empiricism in Am erican Religious Thought o f the 
American Academy of Religion, November 1992.
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This paper defends such a reading and examines their respective contributions 
to a non-relativist, reconstructionist post-modernism. A fuller discussion of com pa­
rative strengths of Dean and Van Huyssteen appears in the recent University of Port 
E lizabeth dissertation of Barend J du Toit, Text and experience: A  comparative study 
o f  Am erican religious empiricism and critical realism. This contains a discussion of 
the A m erican context o f D ean’s work, including the ‘Chicago School of Theology’ 
and the current work of Nancy Frankenberry. Du Toit gives a helpful analysis of the 
developm ent o f Van H uyssteen’s theology and has som e insightful com m ents on 
postmodernism in theology. Du T oit’s interpretation of D ean makes him m ore of a 
deconstructionist than I do. 1 am thankful to Du Toit for the stimulus he has given 
me and to his help in understanding Van Huyssteen’s im portant work.
2. W E N T Z E L  VAN HUYSSTEEN
W entzel van Huyssteen has been head of religious studies at the University o f Port 
Elizabeth in South Africa for a num ber of years. In January 1992 he was appointed 
McCord Professor of Theology and Science at Princeton Theological Seminary.
Van Huyssteen’s critical realism is an attem pt to affirm, on the one hand, a refe­
rential function of religious language, a truth status to that language, and rationality, 
explanatory power, and the possibility of progress in theological inquiry. O n the 
other hand, he seeks to avoid foundationalism by a strong assertion of the m etapho­
rical nature of language and of fallibilism.
Nancey M urphy has criticized Van H uyssteen for his failure to move beyond 
m odern ist foundationalism . V an H uyssteen’s com m itm ent to realism  and  the 
rational and progressive nature of theology expose him up to this criticism. How­
ever, when his moves toward holism and the roots of language in a community are 
explored, as well as his fallibilism, he will be seen to be a post-m odernist, opening 
up a genuine alternative to  both foundationalism  and arbitrary  anti-foundationa- 
lism.
We shall begin with an exposition of the constructive p art o f his 1986 book, 
translated in 1989 as Theology and the justification o f  faith  (V an Huyssteen 1989). I 
am om itting all discussion of his work as historian of post-B arth ian  theology and 
post-positivist philosophy of science, of his critical realistic herm eneutical theory, 
and his "broader concerns to develop a notion of post-modern rationality.
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2.1 Critical realism
Critical realism is defined by Van Huyssteen in opposition to a  subjectivism or rela­
tivism w hich den ies a  re fe ren tia l function  to  language, and to a naive-realistic 
assumption of the literal and definitely certain character of correct language. Criti­
cal realism ‘attem pts to say something about a reality beyond our language by means 
of provisional, tentative models’ which are clearly seen as ‘hum an constructs’. The 
critical qualification  cautions tha t the m etaphoric nature  o f language shows that 
‘models should never be absolutized or ideologized, but should retain  their open­
ness and provisionality throughout the process of theorizing’ (V an Huyssteen 1989: 
142).
The critical realist believes that, when a model is employed, ‘something new and 
valid is being said about reality which the user of the model believes describes it bet­
ter, m ore appropriately  than  o ther com peting views’ (V an H uyssteen 1989:157). 
However, there is ‘no uninterpreted access to reality and...in the process of in terpre­
tation the role of m etaphor is central’ (Van Huyssteen 1989:158). Thus theological 
concepts and models are ‘provisional, inadequate, and partial’ yet ‘actually refer and 
are as close as we can get to speaking accurately of reality’. Thus the m etaphors and 
models of religion are ‘to be taken seriously but not literally, for although they refer 
in an ontological or cognitive sense, they are always partial and inadequate’ (Van 
Huyssteen 1989:158).
Since Van Huyssteen does so much of his thinking in conversation with the phi­
losophy of science, it is not surprising that the post-K uhnian situation is significant 
for him. G iven the realization that scientific knowledge is ‘never independent of 
social context’, the question becomes urgent for both science and theology: if ‘scien­
tific as well as theological assertions are thus socially created’, are the ways of both 
science and theology to reality firmly barred? W hat prevents them  ‘from becoming 
m ere social ideologies’ (V an H uyssteen 1989:148)? A t this point V an Huyssteen 
has found corroboration in Ernan McMullin’s ‘scientific realism’.
For the scientific realist the theoretic language of science is...meta- 
phoric  and thus open-ended  and ever capable  of fu rth er develop­
ment....Scientific realism ...not only highlights the role of m etaphoric 
reference in scientific theory formation while honoring the provisiona­
lity and sociohistorical nature of all knowledge, but it also enables us 
to retain  the ideals of truth, objectivity, rationality, and scientific pro­
gress in an exciting and reinterpreted way.
(V an Huyssteen 1989:154f; c p McMullin 1982:32; 1984:35).
Van H uyssteen w arns against a superficial transferring  of the concept o f realism  
from  the philosophy of science to theology. It is not an established theory, but a
J A  Stone
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‘promising and suggestive hypothesis struggling for credibility’ (V an Huyssteen 1989: 
155). In short, critical realism in theology is a  key part of a post-positivistic concep­
tion  of ra tionality . It involves the assertion  tha t ‘our theological constructs are 
som ething like, or in an anticipatory and provisional sense disclose something of the 
Reality for which our metaphoric, relational theological language reaches out’ (Van 
Huyssteen 1989:162).
22  Religious and theological language
The relation between language and experience for Van Huyssteen could be thought 
of as an interplay. No experience, or at least no religious experience, is pre-linguis- 
tic, o r pre-theoretical. Language not only represents or reflects reality, it also con­
stitu tes reality. Religious experience, indeed all in tellectual activities, including 
theology, are sociocultural forms and thus governed by the language and traditions 
of specific groups (V an Huyssteen 1989:128, 137,140,168).
T he m etaphoric language of religious experience should be transform ed into 
theological concepts in o rder to  achieve conceptual clarity. This is a three-stage 
process, with models as the midpoint between m etaphorical language and theologi­
cal theory. In this, theology parallels science. Following M cFague, a  model is ‘a 
dom inant m etaphor, a m etaphor with staying jwwer’, an extended and systematized 
m etaphor (M cFague 1982:23; cp 67, 103). Thus the m etaphors of G od as Father or 
Jesus as Saviour becam e models for Christian believers while the m etaphor of inspi­
ration developed into the various theories of inspiration. Models provide not only a 
way of speaking of the unknown in terms of the known but, as networks of language 
which strike a balance between simplicity and detail, as comprehensive interpretive 
networks, models open up new dimensions by providing suggestiveness and fertility.
Theoretic language needs to remain in touch with its m etaphoric roots in order 
to preserve the m etaphoric tension inherent in all language, a tension which can so 
easily stagnate. T he im portance of models is as a space within the continuum  for 
this tension, a place for m etaphor to nourish theory and for theory to lend perspec­
tive to m etaphor (V an Huyssteen 1989:141).
Van H uyssteen (1989:125) joins o ther recent w riters who stress the referential 
character of m etaphor, that it is not merely decorative o r expressive in function. 
M etaphor opens up new insights into our world (Van Huyssteen 1989:134f). M eta­
phor redescribes reality, helps us gain new insight into the world. As disclosive of 
the world, m etaphor leads into realism. But since insight is not precise or literal, 
m etaphor also leads to critical realism . The antithesis o f subjective and objective
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thought is replaced by a  relational conception of truth. All knowledge is m etaphori­
cal and thus tentative, dynamic, historical, relational and also cannot be completely 
conceptualized (Van Huyssteen 1989:137).
2 3  T he role o f comm itment
An issue for Van Huyssteen’s version of critical realism is the role of the personal 
com m itm ent of the theologian, o r of any theoretical w orker for that m atter. The 
theologian is a believer, reflecting a commitment to Jesus Christ. This is a  problem 
for an appeal to rationality. But to recognize this ‘personal o r subjective religious 
com m itm ent’ is not to opt for irrationality. (V an Huyssteen has here an apprecia­
tive reference to Polanyi, who speaks of the fiduciary rootedness of all rationality.) 
Objective thought implies com m itted thought, since criteria of validity always need 
subjective empathy for their appropriate applicability. Com m itm ent is not a  sign of 
im perfect knowledge, but ra ther ‘an essential com ponent o f all rational cognitive 
developm ent’ (V an Huyssteen 1989:131).
Theological reflection ‘takes place within the context of an ultim ate faith com­
m itm ent to G od as a personal and transcendent C reator’ (V an Huyssteen 1989:159). 
On the level of theoretic reflection in theology, this ultim ate comm itment functions 
in the sam e way as the realist assum ption in the o th er sciences (Shades o f D  C 
Macintosh!). Thus commitment is not an irrational retreat to commitment.
2.4 Theology as problem solving
Van H uyssteen’s ideas here are shaped by a dialogue with the contem porary philo­
sopher of science, Larry Laudan. For both writers problem s and progress (that is, 
the solving of problems) are contextual. ‘Problems -  whatever their nature -  always 
arise in a  specific context of inquiry....W hether som ething is seen as problem atic  
depends largely on the models and theories of the conceptual fram ew ork we bring 
to  bear on the world around us (V an Huyssteen 1989:174). This contextual nature 
of problem s applies to all forms of intellectual problem  including theology. Thus 
theology shares with science the basic need to  identify the real problem s or ques­
tions of its situation and to develop theories as solutions to them.
Van Huyssteen finds this understanding of intellectual disciplines as the search 
for adequate solutions to contextually focused problems to be a further move down 
the road away from  the hegemony of a positivistic account of justification, a road 
down which Kuhn has started.
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Among the problems of theology are the nature of sin, theodicy, the experiential 
basis of faith, ethical and sociopolitical issues, and conceptual problems arising from 
classical theological doctrines, such as the Trinity, predestination, and christology. 
O ther problem s include the choice o f herm eneutical theories, problem s about the 
sacram ents arising from ecumenical encounter, questions concerning truth and error 
in the Christian faith, and the nature of a valid model of rationality for theology.
25  Progress in theology
Laudan argues that scientific progress is a m atter o f contextual problem -solving. 
The locus of progress is not a specific theory so much as the potential for further 
problem -solving in a research  trad ition . F urther, the ra tionality  o f a theory  or 
research tradition may be defined in terms of its capacity for solving problems.
Given Laudan’s willingness to extend these joint concepts of progress and ratio­
nality to all forms of intellectual endeavour, Van Huyssteen applies these notions to 
theology. Thus we find that the rationality of a theological statem ent or model does 
not depend on its ‘ability to state the truth unproblematically’, but ra ther on w hether 
it can show progress in solving the em pirical o r conceptual problem s of theology 
(V an H uyssteen 1989:190). Further, the identification of a problem  is itself p ro ­
gress.
Examples of progress in theology include conceptual problems in the Reform ed 
trad ition  caused by an obsolete scriptural theory being finally replaced by a new 
theory recognizing both the religious dimension of the Bible and the fact that it is an 
ancient N ear E astern volume composed of many writings of different literary forms. 
The insight into the plural literary genres of the Bible is itself a form of progress, 
including the recognition that the historical m aterial is not historiographical in the 
m odern W estern sense, but rather a collection of confessional, narrative, archetypal 
histories. O ur theory of scripture no longer forces us to raise the question as to 
w hether the world was actually created in six days or w hether Adam and Eve were 
the first people. Instead our theory o f Scripture leads us to seek the deeper reli­
gious in tent of the text. This is a m atter of theological progress (V an H uyssteen 
1989:190-194). Finally, insight into the role of theoretical construction and concep­
tualization in theology is itself a form of progress.
R eal progress in theology is com patible with its tentative and provisional cha­
racter (V an Huyssteen 1989:195). ‘Hence the language of theological theories is -  
in term s of a critical-realist model -  always tentative, provisional, and capable of 
further development. For precisely that reason systematic theology must be tolerant
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of a multiplicity o f theories’ (V an H uyssteen 1989:196). However, this does not 
leave us with a fallen Tower of Babel. The diversity is intersubjectively illuminating. 
The various models can criticize and supplem ent each o ther and theologians from 
diverge contexts can help each other (Van Huyssteen 1989:145).
3. NANCEY M U RPHY ’S C R m C lS M  O F  CRITICA L R E A U SM
Nancey M urphy has recently come out with a very interesting neo-Lakatosian jwsi- 
tion in her Theology in the age o f  scientific reasoning. In it she has two criticisms of 
critical realism:
First, critical realism  is a  problem atic position philosophically -  it is 
difficult to get clear about what it would mean unless one interprets it 
either as a truism or as an o u tr^ e o u s  claim to have some knowledge 
of reality apart from our ordinary human ways of knowing. Second...it 
is not clear how it solves the problem  for which it is invoked, namely 
to give an account of how theology and science interact.
(M urphy 1990:198)
Now, for the first criticism, critical realism  is neither a truism  nor an outrageous 
claim. In response to the interpretation that critical realism implies a claim ‘to have 
some knowledge of reality apart from our ordinary hum an ways of knowing’. Van 
Huyssteen replies that:
No sophisticated form o f critical realism , however, would make this 
strong, dated and truly foundationalist claim. A modest and qualified 
form  of critical realism takes seriously the holist approach of current 
postm odern  and postfoundationalist thought and m akes ten tative 
claims through the epistem ic access provided for us by the m etapho­
rical nature of human language.
(Van Huyssteen 1991:12)
As for the second of Murphy’s criticisms, a t least in Van H uyssteen’s case, critical 
realism  is not primarily an attem pt to show how science and theology can interact. 
It is primarily an attem pt to state how theology can make referential claims without 
overstating the precision or certainty of those claims. Philosophy of science, specifi­
cally ‘scientific realism ’, is used to  illustrate  and clarify this position. This does 
show, in a derivative sense, how the philosophy of science and the analysis of theolo­
gy can be com pared, but this is more like a second-order dialogue between philoso­
phy of science and theology, unlike the m ore nearly first-order interaction between 
science and theology proposed by Murphy (1990:1980.
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The upshot o f all this discussion is that Van Huyssteen’s proposal is misunder­
stood by a postm odern  theologian. This m isunderstanding is not occasioned by 
M urphy’s obtuseness. She is an astu te  and careful de lin ea to r of much cu rren t 
thought and her analyses are very helpful. The difficulty is that Van Huyssteen, like 
D ean, is delineating a postmodern form of discourse that avoids the standard dicho­
tomies and both writers can easily be misread by people on the opposite sides of the 
dichotomies.
4. W ILLIAM DEAN
W illiam D ean is a  strong advocate of radical em piricism  and historicism. Nancy 
Frankenberry and he are calling for a radical empiricism in religious studies and for 
a retrieval of the em piricism  of Jam es and W hitehead and the Chicago School of 
Theology (D ean  1986, 1988; F rankenberry  1987). H e is a sym pathetic critic  of 
American neopragm atism and deconstructionism, a helpful cartographer o f the Zeit­
geist and is currently developing a postm odern American public religious discourse 
capable  of providing both resource and judgem ent for culture and public policy 
(D ean  1989, 1991a). 1 am om itting D ean’s historiography of retrieval o f radical 
empiricism and the Chicago School of Theology, his dialogues with current thinkers, 
and his work in A m erican intellectual history towards an A m erican critical public 
discourse.
D ean sees an affectional sensibility as a way into the full dimensions of history. 
Rejecting the view that facts are value-free while values are subjective projections. 
D ean sees history as full of a variety o f meanings and values, both precarious and 
stable, both threatening and beneficial, both boring and interesting. Radical em piri­
cism is the theory which gives central place to the sensibility or discernm ent of these 
meanings. This empiricism is distinguished from earlier British empiricism by inclu­
ding m ore than the five senses and by replacing the natural science paradigm  of 
knowing with a historical model.
I find it helpful to say that he has replaced the m etaphor of a foundation with 
that of an anchor. V alues sensed through this affectional discernm ent are a local 
anchor for otherwise unjustified or even unacknowledged value commitments. An 
anchor is tempoi'ary and local and is not guaranteed to work, but might work. Its 
job  is to provide a tem porary and contextual resting place for a  particular craft. It 
works if the craft is secure for the time being. Something like the axioms of a post- 
Principia Mathematica axiom system, an anchor provides both contextual root and a 
point o f vulnerability, since the anchor is now to be tested  just as the axioms are
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open for inspection. Thus D ean’s version of empiricism is an attem pt to approach a 
value-full history to  provide a non-foundationalist yet realist and local anchor for 
value commitment.
D ean  seeks to  develop a  historicist theory of historical in te rp re ta tion . The 
interpretation of the past is a reconstruction in the present of past experience (since 
the past always comes to us in terpreted). However, this reconstruction is not arbi­
trary, since the past restricts the range of possible interpretations. The m odem  out­
look is that, if we cannot achieve objectivity in interpretation, we are left only with 
arbitrary subjectivity. D ean offers a way of looking at history that avoids this dicho­
tomy.
U niting this theory of historical understanding with the theory and practice of 
Van R ad, the sociohistorical branch of the Chicago School (especially the Shirley 
Jackson case), and some current figures in biblical studies. D ean finds that G od is 
known as we know any friend, through a chain o f successive interpretations. How­
ever, each link is neither arbitrary nor unlimited in possibility since it is anchored to 
the preceding chain of interpretations.
For Dean, history is in the matrix of nature which itself has history. Thus, con­
trary to the implicit or explicit nature-history dualism  of much postm odernism , we 
have a cosmic and scientific matrix to history. Thus, for D ean, everything -  inclu­
ding nature, man, and God -  is known through a chain of interpretations.
Do we have a foundation for our basic convictions? If we want absolute assuran­
ces to dispel a C artesian anxiety, we will not find it. There is no unassailable catego­
rical im perative or basic principle of justice to distinguish clearly betw een the Third 
Reich and the Third World. But if we cannot tell the difference between the Third 
Reich and the Third World we either have not looked or we have allowed the wool 
to be pulled over our eyes. We need not restrict our options to either a secure foun­
dation or the despair or celebration of the lightness of being without a firm founda­
tion. For betw een a universal foundation and being unhooked from the sun, we can 
often find a local, transient, yet real and valuable support. This support, when we 
can find one, is neither in an objective, value-free world, o r in arbitrary  language- 
games, in subjective leaps o f faith, bliks, o r in the ghettos o f isolated traditions, but 
in an affectional sensibility tha t is in touch with the full dim ension of a value-full 
history. Such affectional sensibility is an aesthetic response to the concreteness of 
value in the processes of nature and history, prior to the abstractions of the intellect, 
and points to the full m easure of value in nature and history. The term  ‘affective’ 
here does not have the connotation of ‘subjective’ but is, indeed, ‘objective’. In such 
a fashion we are in touch with divine history as it touches us or, which m eans the 
same for Dean, as we interpret those touchings as divine.
J A  Slone
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Thus D ean  urges us to  use im agination and bodily aw areness of the world of 
worth to write an interpretative history, focusing on local events to evoke a feel for 
the divine struggle in history. R eflecting on these events D ean  has developed a 
post-positivist, historicist theory of empirical value-perception.
5. EV A LU A TIO N  O F  W ILLIAM DEAN
D ean is easily construed as a deconstructionist with no protection against arbitrary 
willfulness. (Charley Hardwick 1989:95 sees D ean as more than a deconstructionist, 
but as allying himself too closely to this position. Hardwick is not alone in this rea­
ding.) My claim is that D ean must be distinguished from deconstructionism. I have 
five reasons to  support my claim:
* Crucial to distinguishing between D ean and deconstructionism is his in terpreta­
tion of Derrida:
Even if to write history is...to newly in terpret the old ini'irpretations, 
to add a difference to a sequence of differences, still, it is not to make 
a totally free and arbitrary gesture....Rather, the signifier is always to 
some extent a function of the signified, the subject always to some ex­
tent a function of the writing that precedes the subject.
(D ean 1986:45).
It is Abrams and Hirsch who read D errida as having ‘stolen the au thor’s right to 
give the text an objective meaning. But if the objective m eaning of the text is 
gone, the text is meaningless -  or, to say the same thing, the meaning of the text 
is simply invented in the subjectivity of the reader’ (D ean 1986:46). N ote the 
dichotomy here: e ither objectivity or invention that is wilful arbitrariness.
In p lace  o f th is  d icho tom y D ean  (w ith L e n tric c h ia ) suggests th a t a 
‘historicisit view o f the inseparability of the self and the world offers a third 
form of knowledge, neither objectivist nor subjectivist, but historicist’ (D ean 
1986:47). The Y ale D errideans (J H illis M iller, Paul de Man, and G eoffrey 
H artm an) read D errida the way A bram s and Hirsch do, ra th e r than  the way 
Lentricchia does, except that they evaluate the putative extrem e subjectivism 
with glee. They are joined by the theological D errideans -  Carl Raschke, C har­
les Winquist, Mark Taylor and Thomas Altizer.
We need not settle on which interpretation of D errida is preferable. Dean 
(1986:48f) says that ‘D errida’s historicism is congenial to  the empirical philoso­
phies of Jam es, Dewey, and W hitehead’ and that ‘in these ways, then, Jam es’s, 
Dewey’s, and W hitehead’s works, and, in effect, the em pirical theology groun­
454 HTS 49/3 (1993)
ded on these works all contain the elem ents for a notion of historical develop­
m ent tha t is consistent with D errida’s’. The claim is tha t these are  consistent 
with the less extreme reading of D errida by Lentricchia. N ote that D ean moves 
im m ediately  in the second passage to underline a  m ajor difference betw een 
himself and D errida -  namely, the inclusion of nature within the realm  of inter­
p re ta tion  and thereby the rejection of the lingering K antian dualism  of world 
and self, of science and humanistic studies in Derrida.
D ean  flirts w ith D errida , bu t a D errida  in te rp re ted  no t as th e  extrem e 
deconstructionist, the enfant terrible o f wilful arbitrariness, bu t a less extreme 
D errida  contro lled  with a scientific analysis o f the world (See point 4 below. 
See also Bob M esle’s 1989, helpful comments in the D ean issue.)
* A second reason for challenging the construal of D ean as a deconstructionist is 
his criticism of M ark Taylor. According to D ean (1988:136), Taylor ‘not only 
refuses to  offer any proposition  about G od a t any m om ent and  in any local 
world - as the classical American theologians did....Taylor refuses to  discuss any 
specifically religious m eaning to  the historical process, even to  ask w hat the 
word "God" might add to our understanding of tha t process’. This quotation  
makes clear that D ean distances himself from Taylor’s refusal to  offer any affir­
m ations abou t G od, no m atter how local and tem poral (and no m atte r how 
hypothetical and vulnerable). D ean  has a desire  to  m ake such affirm ations 
about God, as he sees James, Dewey and W hitehead doing. These are the affir­
m ations that ‘force has a tropism, a spin, som ething urging the growth of value 
in the historical process and that it opens particular truths for their own times’ 
(D ean 1988:136).
D ean (1988:143) appreciates deconstructionism  ‘as a corrective to the her­
meneutical naiveté of the empirical and process theologians -  o f their tendency 
to indulge in the "hopeless attem pt to make correspondence to undescribed rea­
lity serve as a criterion"’. I would add that while correspondence to undescribed 
reality cannot serve as a criterion, this does not elim inate a third option: tran ­
saction with description-laden reality can serve as a foothold towards improving 
our language.
• D ean affirms that we are not restricted to language unattached to a non-linguis- 
tic signified in his discussion of ‘The Elusive "It"’ o f radical empiricist aesthetic 
interpretation (D ean 1986:97-99). D ean notes, in a brilliant analysis, a ‘curious 
linguistic move’ by William James, Dewey and W hitehead.
W hitehead...said  tha t the key to explanation ‘is the feeling of each 
ob jec tive  fac to r as an  ind iv idual "It" w ith its own sign ificance’.
J A  Stone
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(W h iteh ead  AI, 262.) Why the inarticu la teness , especially  from  
W hitehead...?  T he answ er may be tha t by using ‘It’ in the way he 
does, he is attem pting to point to a primal, physical, and im m ediate 
experience only vaguely and incompletely expressible through ordina­
ry language. Virtually the same linguistic awkwardness appears in the 
writings o f his American compatriots, Jam es and Dewey. In Essays in 
radical empricism, Jam es w rote, ‘the instant field o f the p resen t is... 
plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, a  simple that’ (Jam es 23).
In Art as Experience, in his efforts to define that im perceptible ‘qua­
lity’ in our experience of the im m ediate world, Dewey stumbles from 
language about having ‘an experience’, to illustrations such as ‘that 
was an experience’, and ‘that m eal’.
(D ean 1986:97f; italics Dewey’s)
D ean continues by noting how this reference to qualities of experience is exten­
ded by W hitehead to religious experience and that in this he is in accord with 
Jam es. This discussion shows that for Dean language, at certain crucial places, 
does refer beyond itself.
D ean makes explicit reference to principles which place a  limit on in terp re ta­
tion. This makes it difficult to  place him simply with the deconstructionists. 
O ne principle is that past interpretations place limits on present interpretations 
(D ean 1988:42). The second principle is that history is in contact with extra-his­
torical processes, although the contact is mediated through language and tradi­
tion.
I believe tha t these two principles help preven t the wilful arb itra riness 
which Hardwick rightly is concerned about. U nfortunately D ean does not take 
care to guard him self against a deconstructionist in terpre tation  of his writing. 
However his article on ‘Humanistic historicism and naturalistic historism’ helps 
to clarify his position here. I suggest that a transactional realism would account 
for the fact tha t research  can change a h istorian’s mind and would explicitly 
guard against wilful arbitrariness (see Stone 1992:127-135).
In ‘H um anistic historicism  and naturalistic  historicism ’ and elsew here D ean 
sketches a naturalistic (or naturalistic-hum anistic) historicism in contrast to a 
merely humanistic historicism. Deconstructionism is an example of a  humanis­
tic historicism, along with the neopragmatists and narrative theologians. D ean’s 
(1991b) argum ent in this article also shows how he differs from deconstructio­
nism.
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T he difference is th a t naturalistic  historicism  includes in terp re ta tions of 
nature , including scientific in terpre tations, in the chain o f in terp re ta tions to 
which the presen t in te rp re te r adds. H istories about nature , as well as about 
hum an culture, would be w ritten. Hum anistic historicism limits historical data 
to interpretations of hum an culture, omitting the interpretations of science and 
o ther histories o f nature. It lacks the critique of science, thus losing a m ajor 
defence against prem odern authoritarianism , supernaturalism  and biblical lite­
ralism.
Such a  historicism would still be historicist, relative to a  tim e and place (for 
even the testimony of the scientific community is relative to  a  tim e and place). 
N evertheless, since scientific language refers to observations and experiences, 
however theory-laden, of a non-human world, our language is limited by the cri­
tique of science which would be a defence against supernaturalism . For natura- 
listic-hum anistic historicism  the range of testim ony w ould be w ider and the 
pragm atic tests available would be stricter than for humanistic historicism. Such 
a historicism would not be foundationalist or objectivist. Scientific observation 
and experience limit scientific language in a non-foundational way. This does 
not introduce a  correspondence theory of truth. It does introduce a pragm atic 
test of scientific hypotheses.
Put together, these five reasons are my a ttem pt to  buttress my claim that 
D ean is not a  deconstructionist, even though a prim a facie  case can be made 
that he is.
J A  Stone
6. CONCLUSION
T here  are a num ber of questions that could be pu t to both V an H uyssteen and 
Dean. Both of them  need, I think, to clarify somewhat their notion o f God. D ean’s 
needs to specify what kind of chain of interpretation characterizes God, or if tha t is 
too essentialist, w hat kind of link does he now propose to add. Also, what is the 
relationship betw een G od and the tropism toward complexity? How widespread is 
this tropism and how closely does he wish to shave with Occam ’s razor? Both thin­
kers may need to think dialogically about other religions, alternative chains of in ter­
p re ta tio n s  or o th e r basic m odels. W hat does the ir via m edia  betw een  founda- 
tionalism  and arb itra riness have to say about the pluralism  or parity am ong the 
world’s religions? Van Huyssteen may need to  clarify the nature of the basic com­
mitm ent of a theologian. How does it differ from a scientist’s basic com m itm ent? If 
it is non-negotiable, is it provisional o r corrigible? Does it necessarily comm it one 
to a personal C reator?
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Finally, does the notion of a transactional realism help what they are doing? I 
propose a transactional realism, although this adds to the already num erous varie­
ties of realism. By transactional realism I m ean that experience is a type of encoun­
te r betw een persons and their world, neither one independent o r necessarily dom i­
nant in the transaction. It is not language all the way down, nor are there uninter­
preted observations or experiences of any significance. R ather, there is an interplay 
between many factors which, for simplicity’s sake, we may call a transaction between 
language and world.
The point is not that we can ‘get it right’, but that we can get it better. Realism
-  and I am not comm itted to the term  -  is used not to imply a ‘real’ starting point or 
an attainable goal, but to point to the need for im provem ent. The transaction is a 
process and ‘realism’ I use as a slogan to guard us against complacency by resting in 
the process, to have a general distrust of both inherited beliefs and untutored expe­
rience. Arbitrariness lies in accepting, rather than revising, the present stage of the 
transaction.
We are often in touch with the world or, better, we are often in touch with part 
of the rest of the world and it is in touch with us. We often m isinterpret the touch­
ings. The moral o f the story of the blind men and the elephant is not just that they 
could not tell they had an elephant, w hereas sighted people can tell. R a ther the 
men were in touch with the elephant and, when they compared their touchings, pro­
bably went back for another feel. While some may have been stubborn and insisted 
that they felt a rope or a wall, I suspect that some of them went back and reconstruc­
ted or improved their experience. I use the phrase ‘im proved’ not ‘corrected their 
experience’. ‘Im prove’ has less of a sense of truth, of a clear standard by which to 
correct.
W hat we have is a courageous hope that the standards that we dimly 
grasp are not too misleading. Transactional realism is an anticipatory 
realism , a realism  o f hope....The claim  is not that our theories and 
models, when true, map the world as it really is, but that the process 
o f revision toward what the world really is can be worth the struggle, 
even though we will never know how adequate the m apping is. The 
claim  is, fu rther, tha t when our theories, m odels, and visions have 
been subject to appropriate scrutiny, despite our propensity to error, 
they are worth the risk of relying on, acting on, living by.
(Stone 1992:130)
Although I have some misgivings about the possible m isunderstanding of the term 
‘realism ’, 1 do propose the notion of a transaction betw een subject and object as a 
serious candidate for reflection. The term comes from Dewey, although w hether it
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com m its one to a religious naturalism  is ano ther question. My chief question for 
both w riters is w hether they find the notion of a transaction helpful in developing 
their non-relativist, or at least non-arbitrary, post-modern, non-foundationalism. If 
it is not helpful, what m etaphor would they suggest?
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